One contribution of 13 to a theme issue 'Energy management: flexibility, risk and optimization' . Energy systems of the future are envisaged to encompass multiple interacting autonomous entities. The theory of games provides the foundations for the design and analysis of such systems. This paper reviews models and results that would be of use for such analysis. Classically, games have involved players whose strategies are coupled only through the dependence of utility functions on strategies of other players. However, in many practical settings in the energy domain, system-level limitations bind the choices players can make. In 1965, Rosen (Econometrica 33, 520-534 (doi:10.2307/1911749)) pioneered the study of a class of games where there is a common constraint, called a shared constraint, that couples the strategies available to the players. We discuss how this seemingly benign extension has important ramifications, ranging from the very definition of an equilibrium concept, to other key issues such as existence, uniqueness and efficiency of equilibria. We show how the presence of a shared constraint naturally leads to notions of a price and forms the motivations for more recent models. Although most of the paper has the character of a survey, occasionally we also prove new results.
Introduction (a) What is a game?
The birth of the theory of games is widely regarded as having resulted out of discussions between John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern in the 1940s about the development of a theory to explain the behaviour of rational agents in the stock market. However, if one digs a bit, it becomes clear that particular instances of assess the game from the point of view of any particular player, but rather from the point of view of an observer of the game. One assumes that players are rational, that is, consistent in seeking their maximum utility and one assumes they are completely aware of the game at hand. Under this assumption, the theory of games provides solution concepts for games and studies their properties (in this paper, we are concerned with mathematical aspects of game theory and not its empirical or behavioural aspects; nice discussions on these matters can be found in [3, 4] ). A solution concept is a function that produces, for each game in a class, a collection of strategy profiles from that game. Normatively, a solution concept can be considered as a collection of recommendations that specify strategies that players should adopt in the game. For a solution concept to be meaningful, it must produce, for each game in the class, a non-empty set of recommendations that are consistent with the assumptions of rationality and the extent of communication allowed. And for it to be useful, it should be reasonable to regard it as an outcome for the games in that class. Many of the foundational developments in the theory of games are built around defining and refining these solution concepts [5] .
The Nash equilibrium [6] is one such solution concept. A Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile with the property that no player can benefit from deviating unilaterally from it. This concept applies under the assumption that the game is non-cooperative, that is, players cannot communicate with each other and cannot enter into binding agreements. When these assumptions hold, the Nash equilibrium asks for the most reasonable property we can demand from any solution concept. After all, if players cannot communicate or form binding agreements, then only unilateral deviations are feasible. And if a strategy profile is not robust to such deviations, then it cannot be regarded as the final outcome of the game.
Alongside the theory of games, in the 1950s, another fascinating and closely related mathematical theory, that of organizations, managements and hierarchies, took root, taking the name team theory [7, 8] . In a team, players have a common utility function that they collective seek to maximize. However, they have different, and often incomplete information. Team members have to design their strategies so as to maximize the utility they receive while being constrained to act only using their respective information. In later years, engineers, mathematical control theorists and information theorists came to realize that the understanding that team theory seeks forms the foundation of stochastic control, information theory and indeed any collaborative decision-making problem in a stochastic environment [9] . While most of this paper concerns game theory, we will also briefly touch on team theory, albeit without the complications brought by stochastic environments.
Future energy systems are envisaged as having multiple interacting components that would achieve socially desirable outcomes without compromising the autonomy of individual components. When designing systems like these, one has to confront the question: what is the outcome of all this interaction? We will see examples where game theory provides us with answers to such questions. One models these interacting components as individual players, and depending on the situation at hand, one ends up with either a game or a team problem. Using solution concepts, one analyses the outcome of games. In addition, one can also consider the problem of designing games so that the outcome is of a desired nature. This is part of the theory of mechanism design and auction theory [10] which has been successfully applied in many domains [11] . Today as the modelling, control and optimization of complex systems with humans in the loop, such as communication systems, power systems and the Internet of things, takes centre stage, the theory of teams and the theory of games would be key to the design and development of the systems of the future.
The aim of this survey is to add to the arsenal of the system designer and analyst some basic tools and results from the theory of games and teams with shared constraints. We will concern ourselves mainly with conceptual issues such as modelling and equilibrium selection, but since these issues have their origins in technical considerations, we will also review some technical results. 
(b) Shared constraints: background and organization
We now come to the topic of this paper. Recall again the coupling between players that is present in a game. The coupling we mentioned there was because the utility of a player was a function also of the strategies of other players. This paper concerns the case when the strategies available to a player are also dependent on the strategies of other players. These games are called games with coupled constraints. We will review classical and modern results in this context. We will also discuss other closely related models that are inspired by these results.
We are mainly concerned with a particular structure called shared constraints. In such a game, there is a common set for all players in which all strategy profiles are required to lie. Let us take an example. Consider an electric power grid and players that are power producers who want to decide their levels of production for the day. Their strategies are the amounts of power they inject into the grid and the utility they derive is the profit from this injection. However, the amounts of power these players inject depend on operational constraints. The total power injected cannot be greater than what is demanded, and the power injections must meet the physical constraints of the grid, including line capacities and Kirchhoff's laws. It is evident that these are systemlevel constraints that all strategy profiles must satisfy and that these constraints are common for all players. These power producers could be from competing firms, in which case we have a game in the usual sense. Or they could be generators that are owned by a single firm but have to coordinate their production to meet these constraints by making independent decisions. In this case, we have a team problem.
This additional coupling brings in new sources of complexity. Mathematically, the main theorems that classical results rest on cease to apply and new lines of analysis have to be devised. In §2, we review the seminal contribution of Rosen [12] in this regard that forms the basis for the rest of the paper, and indeed the further investigations in this field. Apart from technical hurdles, there are conceptual issues as well. Chiefly, there are two ways to generalize the Nash equilibrium which have very different consequences for further results. We review these problems and their implications in §3. In §4, we discuss team problems with shared constraints. The paper concludes in §5. We begin the formal study in the next section with some definitions, following which we discuss applications to the general area of energy management. The game is said to be a team if
We denote by x i ∈ X i the strategy of player i ∈ N and by x the composite (column) vector (x 1 , . . . , x N ) ∈ X where X := i∈N X i . The profile of strategies of all players other than player i is defined as
Each player seeks to maximize his or her utility. Thus, one may represent the decision problem of a player as the following optimization problem:
We will refer to this game as {Q 1 , . . . , Q N }.
Definition 1.2.
A Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile We now introduce shared constraints. Note that any strategy profile in the game above is required to lie in X. Suppose we instead ask that every strategy profile lies in a prescribed set C ⊆ R m . This set C is the shared constraint. Assuming x −i to be the profile of strategies of all players other than i, the strategies available to player i are those x i such that, together with x −i , the vector (x i , x −i ) lies in C. In other words, these strategies are
In this case, one may surmise that player i is faced with the following decision problem:
It is apparent that if C happens to equal X, then the set K i (x −i ) = X i and the problem P i (x −i ) becomes the same as problem Q i (x −i ). One can verbally extend the notion of the Nash equilibrium to such games. Definition 1.3. The game {P 1 , . . . , P N } is said to be a generalized Nash game with shared constraints. A strategy profile x * = (x * 1 , . . . , x * N ) is a (generalized) Nash equilibrium of the game
In the rest of the paper, unless necessary for emphasis, we will drop the qualifier 'generalized' for the Nash equilibrium.
(d) Game theory and energy management
We now discuss applications of game theory to the general area of energy management. The smart grid is a paradigm envisaged for future electric power systems wherein computing and communication technologies would be synchronized with classical power systems to allow for enhanced grid management. One of the main challenges in grid management is matching demand and supply. Traditionally, this has been achieved by allowing demand to be autonomous and altering supply to maintain the balance. However, communication between the supply-side and the demand-side allows for demand-side management wherein consumption is tuned to match production. In one possible architecture, it is imagined that the grid would send price signals to individual consumers, who would in turn adjust their consumption levels.
How does one design and analyse such a system? In particular, what can we say about how consumers would behave and can we incentivize them to behave in a way that facilitates grid management? Game theory concerns itself with precisely these kinds of questions and in this case provides an elegant answer. Consider the following model from [13, 14] . We have a system with one power source and a set N = {1, . . . , N} of consumers. Suppose a day is divided into T time slots. Suppose the consumer i ∈ N owns a set A of appliances and the consumption of appliance a ∈ A at time t is x t i,a ∈ R. The consumption schedule for an appliance a is x i,a := (x 1 i,a , . . . , x T i,a ) and the net consumption schedule of consumer i is x i = (x i,a ) a∈A . The consumer would want to maximize the net utility ϕ i (x i ; x −i ), which is the benefit derived from less charges for the consumption. Since charges depend on the consumption of other consumers, ϕ i also depends on x −i . This results in a game with the consumers as the players and consumption schedules as strategies. Having posed the game, one analyses it using solution concepts. The authors in [13] show that, for certain type of utility functions, a Nash equilibrium of this game exists and all equilibria minimize the total cost of the supply side. Thus, game theory suggests that if consumers are incentivized in a certain way, autonomous behaviour of individual consumers would automatically result in minimum cost on the supply side. One may consider additional constraints on the above model. For example, one may impose a peak power constraint capping total consumption at p max :
One may also impose caps according to time slots:
i∈N a∈A
or appliance-level caps,
Each of these constraints results in common system-level constraints for all players in the system. The resulting game with C specified by any of the above constraints is a game with shared constraints.
Following is an example of a team problem (a more detailed example can be found in [15] ). The smart grid is envisaged to comprise a large number of smaller microgrids. These microgrids can exchange energy between themselves via a substation to meet excess demand or reduce energy wastage. One can frame this setting as a team problem, with individual microgrids as players, their strategies as the power they exchange with the substation and their common objective as reducing the net mismatch between demand and supply. One can analyse this system based on solution concepts of game theory. For example, one may employ the concept of a collective optimum for all microgrids (called the team optimum), or assume only individual rationality and no communication and employ the Nash equilibrium (in this case called the person-by-person optimum), or, as done in [15] , allow microgrids to form coalitions and use concepts from coalitional game theory for analysis. One may additionally surmise that these strategies are constrained by common system-level constraints such as line capacities. In this case, one has a team with shared constraints.
It is evident that more or less any setting with multiple autonomous rational entities leads one to the problem of having to predict the emergent outcome and assessing the properties of this outcome. Game theory provides a large set of tools for accomplishing this. Energy systems are replete with situations where multiple rational entities interact within physical operational constraints [14, 16] . These systems can be designed, analysed and optimized using principles of game theory and team theory. A key step in applying game theory is identifying a small set of strategy profiles as plausible outcomes of the game. While solution concepts provide one with the definitions of such profiles, to apply them one has to also grapple with finer details such as existence, uniqueness and selection of equilibria. The following sections provide precisely this background for games with shared constraints.
Basic theory
Having defined the Nash equilibrium, we have to first assess if a profile of strategies satisfying the definition even exists. Let us recall how one shows the existence of a Nash equilibrium for a classical game. This argument has been used by many authors, including Nash himself [6] . For games with coupled constraints, a similar argument was employed by Arrow & Debreu [17] (they called such games abstract economies). Let SOL[·] denote the set of optimal solutions of a problem '·'. A set-valued map T from a set X to Y takes as values subsets of Y for each x ∈ X; we denote this by
and let R :
It is then clear that x * ∈ X is a Nash equilibrium of the game {Q 1 , . . . , Q N } if and only if x * ∈ R(x * ). In other words, x * is a fixed point of R Q . Note that this notion of a fixed point generalizes the usual notion for fixed points of a function; indeed, if R Q were single-valued, we would get that x * is a fixed point if x * = R Q (x * ).
The most common argument for the existence of equilibria follows the use of fixed-point theory. One invokes a suitable fixed-point theorem and shows that R Q satisfies the hypotheses of that theorem. One of the most frequently invoked fixed-point theorems is that of Kakutani.
Theorem 2.1 (Kakutani's fixed-point theorem). Let S ⊆ R n be convex and compact, and let T : S ⇒ S be a set-valued map. If T is convex-valued and has a closed graph, then T admits a fixed point.
To apply this theorem, it remains to check if R Q satisfies these assumptions, which it indeed does under fairly general conditions. This yields the following theorem (e.g. [18] 
The above theorem is proved by showing that if these assumptions hold, X is convex and compact, and R Q is convex-valued and has a closed graph. Let us see what happens when we attempt to apply the same logic to the game with shared constraints. Let
The profile x * is a Nash equilibrium of {P 1 , . . . , P N } if and only if x * ∈ R P (x * ). We may once again attempt to show that R P satisfies the hypotheses of Kakutani's fixed-point theorem. Once again X is convex and compact and R P is convex-valued. The main difficulty arises in showing that R P has a closed graph. The root of this difficulty is that, for each i ∈ N , problems P i (x −i ) are parametrized by x −i in the objective function ϕ i as well as the constraints K i (x −i ). For such problems, continuity of K i (x −i ) is as good as necessary for the closedness of the graph of R P [19] . Unfortunately, continuity of set-valued maps like K i is rare, and many problems of interest do not have this property (e.g. [20] ).
(a) Rosen's argument
This brings us to an interesting juncture. The game with shared constraints is a very reasonable formulation, but usual mathematical tools seem to not apply to its analysis. Rosen [12] devised a fascinating new argument that finds a way around this. Define Ψ :
And consider the set-valued map Υ P : C ⇒ C, defined as
Rosen shows the following theorem. Rosen shows that fixed points of Υ P are Nash equilibria, whereby it suffices to show the existence of a fixed point to Υ P instead of R P . The beauty of Rosen's argument is that while Kakutani's fixed-point theorem does not always apply to R P , when ϕ i 's and C have the above properties, it does apply to Υ P .
Note that Rosen's argument works with a rider-all fixed points of Υ P are Nash equilibria, but there may be Nash equilibria of the shared constraint game that are not fixed points of Υ P . Thus, there are two categories of equilibria to these games: fixed points of Υ P and fixed points of R P . We will refer to fixed points of Υ P by the term variational equilibria [21] . Rosen had defined a closely related concept of a normalized equilibrium (we will discuss this in §3). 
2 ) ∈ C and the corresponding sets K 1 (x * 2 ), K 2 (x * 1 ) and K(x * ) are depicted. −F(x * ) (with origin shifted to x * ) is depicted. It can be seen that x * solves QVI(K, F) since −F(x * ) makes obtuse angles with all vectors (y − x * ) as y ranges over K(x * ), and is hence a generalized Nash equilibrium. However, x * does not solve VI(C, F) and is not a variational equilibrium since −F(x * ) makes an acute angle with (y − x * ) for the point y ∈ C depicted. (Online version in colour.)
Nash equilibrium of the classical game {Q 1 , . . . , Q N } if and only if x * ∈ Υ Q (x * ), where
Hence, in the absence of coupling constraints, these two mathematical characterizations of the Nash equilibrium, as a fixed point of R Q and as a fixed point of Υ Q , are equivalent. More recently, Facchinei et al. [22] rediscovered this relation via the language of variational inequalities. Suppose, for each i ∈ N , that ϕ i (x i , x −i ) is concave in x i for each x −i and continuously differentiable, and that C is closed and convex. A variational inequality VI(C, F) is the problem
where
Facchnei et al. [22] showed the following.
Theorem 2.4. Let C be closed and convex and, for each i ∈ N , let ϕ i (x i , x −i ) be continuously differentiable and concave in x i for each x −i . If x solves VI(C, F), then x solves QVI(K, F).

Figure 1 illustrates the difference between VI(C, F) and QVI(K, F).
Under the assumptions of theorem 2.4, by a well-known characterization of the optimality of convex optimization [19] ,
Similarly,
Thus we have the following proposition. 
Proposition 2.5. Under the assumptions of theorem 2.4, x solves QVI(K, F) if and only if x is a generalized
We end this section with a final result that generalizes Rosen's result to the case of nonconvex C (allowing it to be an acylic absolute neighbourhood retract; for more details about this concept, we point the reader to Borsuk [24] or Border [25] ) and utility functions ϕ i (x) that are not necessarily concave in x i for each i ∈ N . Non-convex shared constraints often arise when considering hierarchical games, such as those in electricity markets [26, 27] . To the best of the author's knowledge, this result is new and has not appeared previously in the literature. Theorem 2.6. Suppose that C is an acyclic absolute neighbourhood retract, the functions ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ N are continuous, and for each x ∈ C, Υ P (x) is acyclic; then the game {P 1 , . . . , P N } admits a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. For the proof, we first note that the first part of Rosen's argument, namely that fixed points of Υ P are fixed points of R P , holds irrespective of the convexity of C. Moreover, it follows from standard optimization theory [20] that if ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ N , and hence Ψ , are continuous, Υ P has a closed graph. Hence, by the Eilenberg-Montgomery fixed-point theorem [28] , it follows that Υ P admits a fixed point. Thus, the game {P 1 , . . . , P N } admits an equilibrium.
(b) Uniqueness
Games can often have multiple Nash equilibria, thereby diminishing the predictive value of the concept. Hence, a sought-after result in the theory of games is the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. Classical games (without shared constraints) have unique equilibria under fairly mild assumptions. However, in the case of shared constraint games, equilibria are generically non-unique. In fact, in many cases there is a manifold of equilibria (see examples and a proof in [21] ).
It turns out that the non-uniqueness is primarily limited to generalized Nash equilibria and is not as common with variational equilibria. In particular, one can show the following by applying standard results on variational inequalities (e.g. [19] ) to VI(C, F). We note here that Rosen [12] employed a closely related concept of diagonal strict concavity to show his uniqueness result.
A tale of two equilibria
We have seen that when analysing a game with shared constraints, one has at one's disposal two classes of equilibria-generalized Nash equilibria and variational equilibria. Which equilibrium does one choose as the outcome of the game? In this section, we delve deeper into the properties and interpretations of these equilibria.
(a) Lagrange multipliers and prices
Suppose the setting of theorem 2.4 holds and consider the case where C = {x ∈ R m |g(x) ≤ 0} where g : R m → R d is a continuously differentiable convex function. Thus, player i's problem P i now becomes
For each player i ∈ N , let λ i ∈ R d be a vector of Lagrange multipliers corresponding to the shared constraint 'g(x) ≤ 0'. It follows from standard optimization theory [19, 29] 
Note that the second requirement in (3.1) asks for N vectors λ 1 , . . . , λ N to be orthogonal to the same vector g(x * ). This implies that (3.1) is underdetermined in a sense that can be made quite precise [21] . The variational equilibrium has the following characterization as shown by Facchinei et al. [22] . This theorem reveals that generalized Nash equilibria and variational equilibria differ in this fundamental characteristic in terms of Lagrange multipliers. While a generalized Nash equilibrium satisfies the KKT conditions in (3.1) with general Lagrange multipliers, the variational equilibrium is rather specific-it satisfies (3.1) with identical Lagrange multipliers for all players.
This distinction between the variational and generalized Nash equilibrium in terms of Lagrange multipliers forms the basis of the study in [21] . In economics, Lagrange multipliers often have the interpretation of a price charged by an administrator for the use of a certain constrained resource. In the case of a game with shared constraints, a generalized Nash equilibrium corresponds to a use of discriminatory prices, wherein distinct players can possibly be charged distinct prices. On the other hand, a variational equilibrium corresponds to the use of uniform prices, where the same price is charged to all players. The authors in [21] note that if players are anonymous to the administrator, the only kind of prices an administrator can charge are uniform prices and thus the only sensible solution concept in such settings is a variational equilibrium. The authors thus argue that the variational equilibrium should be considered as a refinement of the generalized Nash equilibrium and provide conditions under which the existence of a generalized Nash equilibrium implies the existence of a variational equilibrium.
The normalized Nash equilibrium defined by Rosen [12] is a closely related concept. Let R N r = (r 1 , . . . , r N ) > 0 be a vector. x * ∈ C is said to be an r-normalized Nash equilibrium if there exists λ such that (3.1) is satisfied with λ i = λ/r i . Clearly, a 1-normalized Nash equilibrium (where 1 is a vector of ones) is a variational equilibrium. Moreover, an r-normalized Nash equilibrium of the game {P 1 , . . . , P N } is a variational equilibrium of the game {P 1 , . . . , P N } where problem P i is the same as problem P i except that ϕ i is replaced by r i ϕ i . Now from definition 1.3, it easy to note the following simple property: x * is a generalized Nash equilibrium of {P 1 , . . . , P N } if and only if x * is a generalized Nash equilibrium of {P 1 , . . . , P N }. Hence, the set of generalized Nash equilibria of a game is invariant to the choice of r > 0. However, a similar relationship is not true for variational equilibria.
(b) Price-taking formulation
The concept of a price charged by an administrator has recently motivated the study of a pricetaking model. We briefly review this model here, since it provides a new and alternative way of modelling these systems. Consider a case where the utility of player i ∈ {1, . . . , N} depends on the strategy profile of all players and on an exogenous price p. Taking p as fixed, player i chooses his strategy x i . For simplicity, we allow only uncoupled constraints in the decision problem of player i. Thus, player i is faced with the following decision problem: (x 1 , . . . , x N ) . Suppose that he solves the problem
An equilibrium of the above game comprises a price p * and a strategy profile x * such that
Note that this (x * , p * ) is effectively the Nash equilibrium of the N + 1 player game {A 1 , . . . , A N+1 }. However, the constraints of this game are not shared, as can be verified by seeing that the constraint 'g(p; x) ≤ 0' does not appear in the problems {A 1 , . . . , A N }. The problem of finding an equilibrium of games like these has recently been referred to as a multi-agent optimization problem with equilibrium constraints, or MOPECs. The study of these problems is beginning to gather momentum (see the following recent work [30] ). An elegant analysis of electricity markets within this context is the subject of [31] . Here, the price-determining player is the independent system operator and the other players are power generators.
(c) Resource allocation, efficiency and mechanism design
One commonly occurring shared constraint is a resource constraint. In this section, we discuss problems motivated by this setting. Specifically, consider the game {P 1 , . . . , P N } and suppose that the strategy x i represents the portion of a finite resource demanded by player i and that the set C represents the set of all feasible portions. A particularly simple case is when x i ∈ R is the amount of power sent by generator i on a line in a power system with capacity C and C = {x ∈ R N | i x i ≤ C, x ≥ 0} is the set of all strategy profiles that do not exceed the capacity of the line. We consider a setting where players play in a generalized Nash game with shared constraint C to allocate this resource among themselves.
In resource allocation, the goal is twofold. On the one hand, one would want to ensure individual rationality and allow each individual to maximize their utility, and on the other, a social planner would want to maximize a social welfare function Θ. This dichotomy has been traditionally analysed using the theory of mechanism design and auction theory [11] . The latter theories have been applied extensively for the design of electricity markets and for smart grid management [16] . Usually, one considers Θ(x) ≡ i∈N ϕ i (x), the sum of the utilities of all players, whereby the social planner's problem is SOC maximize
Let x * * be a solution of problem SOC and x * be a Nash equilibrium of the game {P 1 , . . . , P N }. The efficiency of the equilibrium x * is the ratio (Θ(x * )/Θ(x * * )). Generally, one asks for the infimum (worst case) or the supremum (best case) of this ratio over all equilibria of a class of games or utility functions. An equilibrium is said to be efficient if its efficiency is unity.
Since we are concerned with shared constraints, one can ask a sharper question: what is the relative worst case and best case efficiency of the variational equilibrium and the generalized Nash equilibrium? The following example, adapted from [32] , shows that the variational and the generalized Nash equilibrium both can have zero efficiency in the worst case and unit efficiency in the best case. 
. . , ε, 2ε). By theorem 3.1, the set of variational equilibria of this game is the set of x for which there exists λ such that
Since c > 0, observe that any λ satisfying these equilibrium conditions must satisfy λ ≥ 2ε and that 1 x * = C must hold for any variational equilibrium x * . This implies that, for at least one i, x * i > 0 and hence λ must equal c i for that i. It follows that λ = 2ε and x * = (0, . . . , 0, C) is the only variational equilibrium.
. . , ε, 2ε). As ε + 1 > 2ε > ε, the optimal value of SOC is C(ε + 1). Thus, the worst case efficiency of a variational equilibrium is at most 2ε/(ε + 1). Letting ε decrease to zero reveals that the worst case efficiency is in fact zero, implying that the variational equilibrium and hence the generalized Nash equilibrium can be arbitrarily inefficient. Finally, note that letting ε approach unity shows that efficiency arbitrarily close to unity is also achievable by a variational equilibrium. Hence the best case efficiency of the variational and generalized Nash equilibrium is indeed unity.
Is it possible to come up with a system where efficiency is guaranteed? This is indeed possible, provided one restricts to variational equilibria. There is a class of games for which every variational equilibrium is efficient. The proof is discussed in [32] . 
for every i ∈ N . Then, for any shared constraint C, every variational equilibrium of the game {P 1 , . . . , P N } is efficient, that is, it maximizes Θ over C.
This theorem shows that if systems or incentives are designed in such a way that (3.2) holds, one is indeed guaranteed efficient outcomes. One simple case where such functions η 1 , . . . , η N exist is when, for concave functions U 1 , . . . , U N , we have ϕ i (x) ≡ U i (x i ) for all i ∈ N (this can be verified by taking η i (x −i ) = j =i U j (x −j )). This is also the setting of general equilibrium theory [10] .
Teams with shared constraints
We now come to our final topic, namely, teams with shared constraints. Recall that the game {Q 1 , . . . , Q N } is a team if ϕ i = ϕ j for all i, j ∈ N . Let us denote this common utility function by ϕ. One can consider two possible settings. First, where players are cooperative, implying that they can communicate and enter into binding agreement about the strategy they plan to play. The resulting goal of a team is to then simply maximize ϕ over the set X. Such a profile is said to be team optimal. The second setting is where they are non-cooperative, that is, that players are unable to communicate with each other. In this case, the right solution concept to apply is the Nash equilibrium, which would now be a profile x * such that
In the parlance of team theory, such a profile is known as being person-by-person optimal [18] . Clearly, a team optimal profile is also person-by-person optimal. Though seemingly disparate, it is remarkable that team optimal and person-by-person optimal profiles can in fact coincide under fairly general assumptions. It is known [7, 18] that if ϕ is concave and continuously differentiable, and for each i ∈ N , X i is closed and convex, then any person-byperson optimal profile is also team optimal. There are counterexamples showing that this relation is not true for problems lacking either concavity or differentiability of ϕ; see [18] .
We now consider a team with shared constraints, that is, game {P 1 , . . . , P N } with ϕ i = ϕ j = ϕ for all i, j ∈ N . To the best of the author's knowledge, this setting has not been studied before. Define R P , Υ P and K i , i ∈ N as before. As was the case in games with shared constraints, defining the person-by-person optimum will become a subtle matter. Definition 4.1. A generalized person-by-person optimum of the team {P 1 , . . . , P N } is a profile x * ∈ C such that x * ∈ R P (x * ). Thus, it is a profile x * ∈ C such that, for all players i ∈ N ,
A variational person-by-person optimum is a profile x * ∈ C such that x * ∈ Υ P (x * ).
We show that even for utility functions ϕ i , i ∈ N where we have the property that in the classical Nash game {Q 1 , . . . , Q N } a team optimum is also person-by-person optimal, for the team {P 1 , . . . , P N } with shared constraints, a generalized person-by-person optimum need not be team optimal. where Λ = (λ 1 , . . . , λ N ). Observe that any x ∈ C is generalized person-by-person optimal. To see this, note that the above conditions are satisfied for Λ = c. Thus while the team optimum is unique, the set of generalized person-by-person optima is the entire set C, implying that there is a generalized person-by-person optimum that is not team optimal. In particular, consider the profile x = (C, 0, . . . , 0). For this generalized person-by-person optimum, ϕ(C, 0, . . . , 0) = εC, which is strictly less than the utility of the team optimum. By theorem 3.1, a variational person-by-person optimum is a profile x that satisfies (4.1) with λ 1 = . . . = λ N =: λ. As in example 3.2, it is easy to see that the only variational person-by-person optimum is the profile x = (0, . . . , 0, C), which is also team optimal.
We now generalize the above example via the following theorem. The proof follows from noting that team optima are solutions of VI(C, −∇ϕ) and F = −∇ϕ. We end this section by assessing the efficiency of a generalized person-by-person optimum x * , that is, the ratio ϕ(x * )/ϕ(x * * ) where x * * is team optimal. The following example shows that this ratio can be arbitrarily small. (ε 2 , ε, . . . , 2ε) and ε ∈ (0, 1) , and take C = {x ∈ R N | x ≥ 0, i x i ≤ C} for some C > 0. Then, as in (4.1), every point in C is generalized person-by-person optimal, whereas the team optimal profile is x * * = (0, . . . , 0, C). Consider the generalized person-by-person optimum, x * = (C, 0, . . . , 0). The efficiency of x * is ε 2 C/2εC = 1 2 ε. Since ε can be arbitrary, the worst case efficiency of a generalized person-by-person optimum is zero.
The best case efficiency is of course unity, since any variational person-by-person optimum is team optimal.
Conclusion
One of the cornerstones of future energy systems is the system-wide coordination of disparate elements such as smart appliances, distributed generation and electric vehicles. Their actions create a web of interconnections that one has to unravel in order to understand the system. The theory of games and teams we have reviewed provides a versatile framework using which this can accomplished. Game-theoretic formulations, and the theory that has been built around them, concerning existence, uniqueness, efficiency and other properties of equilibria, provide avenues for the analysis of such systems. In this survey, we focused on the class of games and team problems with shared constraints, and saw how such problems arise naturally when considering the general theme of energy management. It is evident that these and other tools from the theory of games and teams will find many applications in the management of the energy systems of the future.
